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The biobank consent debate: why “meta-consent” is not the solution 
THE BIOBANK CONSENT DEBATE 
Over the past couple of decades there has been an ongoing, often fierce, debate about the ethics of 
biobank participation.  One central element of that debate has concerned the nature of informed 
consent.  The problem arises because biobanks are repositories of biological material, stored and 
organised in such a way as to make them—and information derived from them—readily available for 
a wide variety of research purposes, by a wide variety of users in an open-ended way.   In order to 
give valid informed consent for the use of their samples and data participants need to be told the 
identity of the researcher(s), the nature and purpose of the research, and about the risks and 
burdens that the research might pose to the participant.  The specific details about future users and 
uses are not yet known at the time of obtaining the sample. Two broad types of proposal have 
emerged (with a wide variety of specific variants of each broad type). One proposal is simply that 
specific informed consent needs to be sought (and obtained) for each separate research project.[1, 
2]  Against this "specific consent" framework it is objected that seeking specific consent every time a 
sample—or personal data derived from a sample—is used for a new purpose, or by a new party, 
poses a considerable financial and administrative burden on researchers and a "drag" on 
research.[3]  Given that samples and personal data can be re-used at points in time remote from the 
original acquisition, actually contacting the donor may be hard, and become more difficult over time.    
An alternative proposal is "broad" consent.[3. 4, 5]   Broad consent theories trade on the fact that 
consent is directed at sets of actions (even when directed at particular individuals).  Consent can be 
given to specified sets of researchers, or research uses (with the proviso that such research and uses 
are monitored and sanctioned by other, semi-independent parties).  Recent broad consent proposals 
have laid emphasis on the way that broad consent is consent to a complex normative framework 
that protects the data subjects' interests, with independent monitoring (e.g., via RECs/IRBs) and 
other aspects of good governance.[6]  It may seem that broad consent cannot be informed consent: 
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how can it be, when the future, specific, research uses (or users) are not yet known? However, at 
root, informed consent requirements are obligations to disclose information that allows a consent 
decision to be made in a certain way (knowingly and reflectively, on the basis of adequate, relevant 
information.  There is a contrast between informed and uninformed broad consent, there is a 
contrast between informed and uninformed specific consent.  Provided the donor is truthfully 
informed about the kinds of uses to which her data might be put, and the kinds of user who may 
have access to them, there need be nothing "uninformed" about a decision to give broad consent on 
that basis to specified kinds of act by any of a specific kind of agent, for any of a range of specified 
purposes.  
The biobank consent debate is one with deeply held convictions on both the "broad" and "specific" 
sides.  In recent years the debate has become yet more complex with the development of “dynamic” 
consent frameworks.[7, 8, 9]  A dynamic consent framework utilises formation technology to enable 
a wide range of continuous, interactive, personalized, channels of communication between 
researchers and data subjects.  Whilst specific consent does involve ongoing communication, such 
communication is grounded in, and restricted to, gaining permission for use of samples and data.  
Dynamic consent, by way of contrast, also aims to allow public engagement with, and involvement 
in, research.  Dynamic consent also affords data subjects a distinctive degree of fine-tuned control 
over the use of their data.  We shall return to this aspect of dynamic consent later.  But, for now, 
what matters is that both dynamic consent and specific consent frameworks reject broad consent, 
so our debate has broad consent theorists on one side, with specific and dynamic consent theorists 
on the other.   
Recently, Thomas Ploug and Soren Holm have developed a new proposal: what they call a meta-
consent framework.[10, 11, 12]  Their meta-consent framework is not specifically developed for, or 
restricted to, biobanks, as it is meant to be applicable more broadly, including secondary research 
uses of already-gathered health data (including data arising from patient records).  But they do hold 
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that the model is applicable to biobank consent. The aim here is to consider whether meta-consent 
does provide a "solution" to the biobank consent debate (leaving aside its adequacy as a solution to 
questions about the regulation of medical data use in other contexts).  It is argued here that contrary 
to Ploug and Holm, there is no moral obligation on biobanks to provide meta-consent, and there are 
further considerations against biobanks offering such a framework.  The biobank consent debate 
remains active as ever. 
THE ARGUMENT FOR META-CONSENT 
What is meta-consent?  Here is how Ploug and Holm put it: 
 [M]eta consent" denotes the idea that people should be asked how and when they would 
like to be presented with a request for consent.  That is, people should be asked to design 
how they in the future would like to provide consent to the use of their personal health data 
and biological material. By expressing a preference for how and when to provide consent, 
people can be said to provide consent on a meta level. This is the defining idea in the model 
of meta consent.[13] 
 
Their central idea is that biobank participants should be offered the opportunity to choose and 
design their own individual consent process, in line with their own preferences.   One participant 
might choose blanket consent for national, public-funded research on non-genomic data; specific re-
consent for national public-funded use of genomic data; and refusal for international use or 
commercial use of her sample.  Other participants are likely to make different choices from the 
“menu” of options.   
Why should biobanks offer meta-consent?  The central consideration that motivates meta-consent is 
that biobank participants vary in their preferences about how they would like to consent: 
Meta consent is a truly individual consent procedure that takes into account the differences 
in personal interests and levels of trust in researchers among the population.[14] 
 
Both sides of the consent debate have focused on “fixed” consent frameworks where everybody is 
offered the same kind of consent framework and the question is, which type of framework—broad 
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or narrow—should be offered to all.   Meta-consent, by way of contrast, offers participants a choice, 
and allows them to choose, in a fine-tuned way, the kind of consent process that they prefer for 
different users and uses of their samples and data.   
COSTS AND BURDENS: WHY ALL THINGS ARE NOT EQUAL 
Suppose we accept that a meta-consent framework would better accommodate variation in 
interests and preferences than a “fixed” proposal.i This does not imply that biobanks are thereby 
under any obligation to offer that degree of flexibility? After all, a biobank participant might prefer to 
be given a laptop for participating.  It does not follow that therefore the biobank ought to provide it   
In response, we might argue that biobanks are going to have to offer some kind of consent 
framework, but they don’t have to offer a laptop or other payments.  All that meta-consent suggests 
is that the biobank should offer individuals to choose their preferred version of the kind of thing that 
is going to be offered anyway, i.e., a consent framework.   
But this line of argument is not strong.  A regulatory framework—such as the consent framework for 
biobank participation—is, or ought to be, designed with a wide range of interests in mind, taking 
into account the interests, needs, costs, burdens and benefits for many different agents.ii[12]    One 
core line of argument for broad consent, for example, is based upon two premises: that broad 
consent is ethically adequate; that specific consent poses considerable burdens on biobanks, and 
those burdens, in turn, shift resources from valuable research onto administrative costs.  To simply 
                                                          
i An (anonymous) referee wonders whether the distinction between preferences and interests might not be of 
relevance here.  It is true that in philosophical writing, especially about the normative basis of rights and 
obligations, focuses on fundamental interests, rather than “mere” preferences (I might prefer one cheese to 
another but do not have an interest here, except the higher-level interest that my preferences be satisfied, all 
things being equal).  Such a distinction does not help Ploug and Holm (who talk of both interests and 
preferences).  The “mere” preference that one have an individually tailored consent regimen is not a candidate 
for grounding an obligation to provide it, and the discussion below suggests that there is no fundamental 
interest that grounds this positive obligation either. 
ii Whilst it is possible, that in some circumstances, regulatory systems might only be required to be responsive 
to only one set of interests, in the case of biobank participation it seems plausible (and we shall assume it to be 
so here) that a regulatory system for biobanks has to balance, at the very least, societal interests in securing 
the results (and benefits) of biobank-enabled research, against a range of individual interests, such as privacy 
interests and the interests that underpin rights over the body and bodily materials. 
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allow people to choose whichever framework they wish might seem to be an irresponsible way of 
“solving” the biobank consent debate.  By analogy,  people have different preferences about 
taxation systems. But it does not solve debates about the proper level of taxation for all to allow 
individuals to choose the tax regimen that they prefer.   
Ploug and Holm do not engage with the fact that regulatory systems should not be decided by 
individual preferences (of one interest group) alone (especially where the balancing of interests is 
part of the deliberative process leading to a regulatory framework).  Instead, we have a weak line of 
support for meta-consent: 
Although different models of informed consent may lead to informed and deliberated 
preferences concerning participation in research passing a threshold of acceptability, it 
seems that we should, all other things being equal, prefer a model of informed consent that 
lead to more informed and deliberated preferences than alternative models of consent 
(emphasis added).[15] 
 
This line of argument is effectively saying that there is no moral reason against providing meta-
consent.  This seems correct, at least insofar as it does not wrong the participant.  Accommodating 
the preferences of participants might be good for recruitment, but such “gifts” have costs. But a 
regulatory framework that does not wrong individuals may still be the wrong one to have.  For 
example, requiring biobanks to give a new laptop to every participant might be great for 
participants, but bad for the research budget.   Ploug and Holm do put in their qualification “all other 
things being equal”, but this raises the question whether all things are likely to be equal.  For 
example, if we compare a broad consent framework with meta-consent, then meta-consent is 
clearly going to pose many additional costs and burdens.   Even if many people choose broad 
consent, some will not.  Worse, the administrative infrastructure needs to be in place to allow 
specific re-consent for all, even if many choose broad consent in the first instance, because 
participants might, at any point change their consent design.  These are costs and burdens that 
simply do not exist on a one-off broad consent.  
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The meta consent  framework also faces most of the problems and burdens of specific consent: 
maintaining contact with participants, and the problem of what to do when participants fail to reply.  
Modern ICT may make communication very rapid, but human beings, with their distractions, other 
interests, emotions and attention, are an essential part of the communicative chain.  Suppose 
30,000 participants in a biobank have opted for specific re-consent.  The technology may be there to 
communicate in an instant, but the authorisation for the use of each sample depends upon someone 
being bothered to “click” the appropriate “I consent” response.  Worse still, the costs and burdens 
or meta-consent are likely to be much higher than even specific re-consent.  It will need to take care 
to avoid false positives where those who chose broad consent are contacted by mistake.  The burden 
here is that administrative systems need to be in place to track, and accurately respond to, individual 
fine-tuned choices.  This is a burden that simply does not exist for broad consent frameworks and is 
less than that needed on specific consent frameworks where all are treated in the same way. 
The objection here is not that that we already have reliable, precise, costings for meta consent.   We 
have not shown that meta consent has to be more expensive relative to alternatives.  There are 
good reasons to believe that it is likely to be so, given the degree of choice offered to participants.   
When Ploug and Holm state that all things being equal meta-consent is preferable to fixed consent 
frameworks, they cannot really get away with the “equal” part of that claim, as things—the costs 
and burdens—are very unlikely to be equal.   
THE “PROTECTING AND PROMOTING AUTONOMY” ARGUMENT 
However, if there is a strong moral argument in favour of meta-consent, in comparison to its fixed 
“rivals”, then it ought to be introduced and any additional costs factored into the total research 
costs.    But is there such an argument? Ploug and Holm, do suggest a more substantive ethical line 
of argument: 
A more flexible model of consent is motivated not only by endeavours to protect research. If 
we really want to safeguard the individuals’ interests—if we want to protect and promote 
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individual autonomy—then we should also protect their desire to provide consent in a 
particular way.[16] 
 
The move here seems to be something like this.  Liberal medical research ethics is grounded in 
respect for autonomy.  Respect for autonomy implies a distinctive kind of positive respect for the 
individual as a free agent when interacting with her.    
 
There may seem to be something intuitively plausible about this line of thought.  After all, surely we 
have the right to shape our consent as we see fit.  We have the right to choose the target of consent 
(the person or persons to whom we give permission); we have the right to choose the scope of 
consent (the set of actions are rendered permissible by our consent) and we have the right to 
introduce conditions on permissibility.  Take a non-biobank example.  If you are going on a long 
vacation and ask to borrow my camera, I have the discretion to insist that you may do so (but others 
may not) for a certain period of time (scope) but  only if you contact me before using it in the rain 
(introducing a condition).  That is, there is a kind of “right to design” built into the right to consent.It 
would be wrong for you to reply “I don’t respect your right to specify how you want to consent, I will 
decide that”.   
 
But here we need to take care to distinguish two very different ways in which someone might fail to 
respect an individual’s “right to design” her own consent.  In our “camera” example above, there is a 
distinction between the following situations; (a) you understand and accept the terms of my consent 
“design”, take the camera but fail to act within those terms; (b) you understand the terms, but do 
not want to comply with them, so you do not take the camera, but ask somebody else instead.  The 
former wrongs me, the latter does not.  The same is true when we turn to requests.  Suppose you 
ask me if you may borrow the camera for a long vacation, but also add the proviso “Look, I’m going 
to be out of reach most of the time, so it won’t be able to get in touch”.  Here you make a proposal 
about the “shape” of consent that you seek.  Even though you do not offer me the opportunity to 
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shape the consent process as I see fit, you do not wrong me.  If I don’t want to lend the camera on 
those terms, I don’t have to, and if I don’t consent on those terms, you may ask someone else. 
 
Biobanks, in general, do not need to recruit any particular individual. What is needed is a sufficiently 
large number of participants of various types.  It does not wrong any particular potential participant 
to ask her if she is willing to consent in a certain way (provided it meets the appropriate standards—
and that is what the ongoing biobank consent debate is about).  If this participant does not like the 
“terms” she does not have to consent to giving a sample.  If she does not consent, then others will.iii  
At this point the advocate of meta consent might argue that these non-biobank examples miss out 
on some important aspects of biobank recruitment. If biobanks have an obligation to protect and 
promote autonomy, doesn't it then follow that they ought to respect participants interests' in 
choosing how to consent?  For is that not an important aspect of their autonomy? The simple 
answer is: no, it does not follow at all.  There is a great cloud of confusion within bioethics around 
the notion of autonomy and the idea of respect for autonomy.  A fundamental, and genuine, part of 
respect for autonomy is to respect the rights and powers that people have: to not force, coerce, 
deceive or mislead by omission.  Informed consent requirements reflect a more demanding and 
specific sense of respect for autonomy.  The underlying ethical rationale for informed consent is that 
if one party wants to do something that would  breach the other party’s rights, then  the requesting 
part should make sure that the rightholder is able to adequately assess that proposal, so that she is 
in a position to make an adequately informed decision whether to consent to that (and thereby 
knowingly undertake whatever risks and burdens have been disclosed). 
But these considerations do not get us anywhere near an ethical argument for offering meta-
consent.  The obligations to gain informed consent are “tethered”, as it were, to the fact that the 
                                                          
iii Of course, if the situation were that almost nobody  would consent unless they were offered meta-consent, 
that would give a strong practical reason for biobanks to offer it; given that there are many well-supported 
biobanks across the globe, without meta-consent having been offered, this seems not to be the case. 
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researcher proposes to impinge upon the participant’s liberty, or to breach her rights.  The reason 
why there are special obligations to disclose facts about the nature of research is because the 
research would breach rights without adequate consent.   Such obligations are restricted in their 
scope, they extend to making sure that this particular decision about what would be a rights-
breaching action can be adequately made.  
There is no general obligation upon researchers to “promote” autonomy in an untethered, open-
ended, general way.  Participants in medical research might have their autonomy, broadly 
construed, limited in a wide variety of ways.  They have low income, low education, or be in an 
abusive relationship.  Their autonomy could be protected and promoted by more pay, better 
education and by a safe route out of the relationship.  But clearly it is not the job of a researcher to 
promote autonomy in every sense, or every way.  
It might be argued that even if there is no general obligation to promote participants’ autonomy, 
there is a narrower, “local”, obligation to promote their autonomy with regard to their decision to 
participate.  But the points made just above apply to the more specific domain too.  A participant 
might be in a better position to make a decision were she more educated, or were she not distracted 
by worries about her leaking roof.  It does not follow that the biobank (or anyone) is under an 
obligation to the participant to “promote” her autonomy in this way.[17]  
An appeal to “autonomy” gives us the sense that there is an argument in play.  We may think of 
areas of research ethics where respect for autonomy is important, we then note that offering more 
choice would, in a broad sense, promote more autonomy, we then flip back to  the idea that respect 
for autonomy underpins obligations, so there must be, surely,  obligations to offer choice of consent 
design.  But this is not an argument, this is a cluster of overlapping intuitions and slogans.  If the 
argument for meta-consent is going to be grounded in some kind of obligation to protect and 
promote autonomy, it cannot be some kind of open-ended general obligation, for then researchers 
would be obliged to protect and promote autonomy in an open-ended way, and clearly there is no 
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such obligation.  On the other hand, if we turn to a more restricted, limited, set of obligations, it is 
not clear that there is an additional obligation over and above the obligation to secure informed 
consent (whatever that amounts to for the biobank situation), whereby biobanks ought to offer the 
participant the opportunity to design her consent process and to then abide by that design and 
undertake all the obligations and burdens that may go with it.   
We noted earlier that the specific consent framework has been developed into dynamic consent.  
Recent formulations of dynamic consent lay stress on the way that an ongoing, interactive, 
communicative platform makes it possible for research subjects to fine-tune their consent.  Indeed, 
Ploug and Holm acknowledge that a dynamic consent model “could incorporate this  ‘meta aspect’  
of the meta consent model, and thereby make their model substantially identical to the meta 
consent model”.[18]  Similarly, advocates of dynamic consent have suggested something very like 
“meta-consent”  “Rather than being restricted to the opportunity only to give broad consent to the 
use of their samples and data, individuals could provide different types of consent depending upon 
the kind of study”.[18]   The arguments offered here do not seek to show that dynamic consent (or 
meta-consent) cannot be justified, it is that the arguments offered by Ploug and Holm do not provide 
support for the idea that it would somehow be wrong, or remiss, to fail to offer such a framework. 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, there is no ethical reason why biobanks should be obliged to offer meta-consent rather than 
a "fixed" option.  Nobody is wronged by making a non-coercive, truthful proposal, whilst denying the 
addressee the opportunity to “design” the scope of consent or to shape the nature of an ongoing 
consent relationship.  Although there is no ethical reason why biobanks should offer meta consent, 
there may be contingent, practical reasons in favour of meta-consent, both in terms of aiding 
recruitment and in terms of secondary effects on public trust, levels of “Involvement” and social 
licence.  But such potential benefits of meta consent in terms of recruitment would have to be 
weighed against the considerable costs and burdens that such a complex governance framework 
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would introduce (we would also need to keep track of whom the benefits accrue to).  Assessing the 
relative costs and benefits of meta-consent  would require a great deal of empirical work by medical 
sociologists, research accountants, and many other parties.   
The aim here has been modest: to show that there is no ethical reason why biobanks should offer 
meta-consent, it does not wrong potential participants to fail to offer them the opportunity to 
design their own consent process.  The biobank consent debate thus continues on, full steam ahead. 
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